Digitalizing Sovereignty – III

Like governance, sovereignty has existed much longer than the modern digital universe. Thus, it has a rich history evolving over several centuries (see references below). Historical consensus indicates that Jean Bodin was its conceptual father in the late XVI Century when the scourge of religious wars was dominating Europe. Treaties such as the 1598 Edict of Nantes and the 1648 Peace of Westphalia are important landmarks for the emergence of the modern nation-state, which owes an outstanding debt to Bodin’s ideas.

However, such mainstream history can be promptly challenged from a non-European perspective. Indeed, even if the word sovereignty was perhaps not used, processes of state formation in China, Egypt, India, Latin America and the Islamic Caliphates, to name a few, should also be an integral part of the story. Many are centuries older than their European counterparts and show different types of sovereignty not always tied to creating a nation-state. For example, China’s Mandate from Heaven legitimized the Emperor’s rule but implicitly included the right to rebellion if the Emperor did not deliver. Similar examples can be found in the other cultures mentioned before. Examining such cases is critical to set the record straight. Moreover, they can provide examples of sovereignty that transcend the modern nation-state and help strengthen the case for the various sovereignty types that Jiang & Belli and others suggest.

Like governance, again, sovereignty is closely related to political power. Indeed, Bodin defines the latter as the highest absolute and perpetual power over the citizens of a commonwealth or society. While still relying on theological grounds to justify the need for a sovereign, Bodin’s definition perfectly introduces the subject. Here, perpetual refers to the fact that a sovereign will always be needed, regardless of who is on the job at any point. “The King/(Queen) never dies” is its slogan. The same goes for presidents and prime ministers, regardless of how they are chosen. Over 30 countries today are defined as constitutional monarchies where the King/Queen has clearly delimited power and authority. On the other hand, absolute monarchies fit more neatly into Bodin’s original definition. Absolute power is perhaps not as straightforward. Bodin’s sovereignty framework assumes the sovereign faces limitations in exercising power, including the prohibition of manipulating succession processes, respect for private property of civilian populations, and restricted capacity to impose arbitrary taxes. Such limitations protect sovereignty from the sovereign who, as a human, can be fallible. In any case, the sovereign does not actually have absolute power. Any abuse of power can thus trigger the right to rebellion, so to speak.

Almost 70 years later, Hobbes refined Bodin’s original idea. First, he rejected the theological justification for a sovereign by introducing the inexorable “war of all against all” idea. Such a sad state of affairs could only be solved by having a supreme authority, a sovereign, who has the legitimate right to rule and to be obeyed by all subjects. The latter, in turn, were supposed to agree to a covenant where they give up their rights for the sake of their own future. Here, we encounter a prototype of a social contract of sorts. In any case, sovereignty is the supreme authority (not power) over a social community that recognizes it as legitimate and agrees to be bound by it.

Riding on the coattails of the Enlightenment and the ensuing discredit of absolute (monarchical) sovereignty, Rousseau put the concept on its head. He rejected Hobbes’ state of war scenario and suggested that humans were initially free and could live together peacefully by balancing individual interests and empathy. As society developed, private property became pervasive, thus leading to inequality and the rule of the wealthy over the rest. Such a precarious situation, which we are reliving today yet again, can only be solved via a social contract where the general will of the people rules. Sovereignty is in the hands of the people, not an absolute monarch. Popular sovereignty thus emerged and critically impacted the development of the 1789 French Revolution—and beyond.

Constitutional sovereignty emerges soon thereafter. It comprises popular sovereignty, the rule of law, the separation of powers, the protection of rights, and a written constitution. It is the basis for modern nation-state sovereignty, albeit not all countries fully follow such a model to the letter.

Such a succinct and oversimplified history should suffice for my purposes. Those interested in digging deeper should check the references and their references.

In any event, four issues must be highlighted. First, it is essential to distinguish supreme authority from absolute authority. Indeed, a sovereign does not need to be involved in every decision-making process to exercise authority. Moreover, she can delegate that to others who might be better qualified. The separation of power is a good example here, albeit executive power can overwhelm the other two, as we are seeing right now.

Second, it is critical to differentiate between internal and external sovereignty. The former requires legitimacy stemming from the populations under its domain. External sovereignty implies that other sovereign entities recognize the former as legitimate.  A lack of external sovereignty can have a considerable internal impact, especially if imperial powers decide not to acknowledge existing internal sovereigns. Colonialism is one great example here, where so-called pilgrims and conquistadores alike ignored sovereign populations and imposed their will by force. In any event, there is indeed a hierarchy of national sovereignties where the most powerful countries can bully others at will, as we are seeing today again!

Third, macro and micro levels of analysis should be set apart. By definition, sovereignty is a macro concept that applies to social groups regardless of their specific traits—albeit the latter can certainly influence how sovereignty evolves. Individual sovereignty, one of the types highlighted by Jiang & Belli, is a micro-category that might be relevant for other purposes. Today, we might have 8 billion sovereign individuals. So we need to return to either Hobbes or Rousseau — you pick! — to bring them together. Let us not forget the so-called sovereign citizen’s movement, which denies all types of sovereignty.

Finally, separating public from private is also relevant. For the most part, sovereignty is a concept targeting the public sphere. That does not mean that private sovereignty does not exist. In the business sector, multinational corporations are a good example. Nowadays, we have big tech, big pharma, and other biggies that operate globally and can even sue national sovereign states if they do not follow the rule of law. Note, however, that all those behemoths have national passports and are thus under the legal sovereignty of their home countries. ICANN is an interesting example of not-for-profit private sovereignty that rules over the digital domain globally, which did not exist until recently and was thus not subject to national sovereignty claims. That is why the UN took no action when it received the official communication demanding prompt dismissal.

In the end, a hierarchy of sovereignties does exist, with some overlapping. Digital sovereignty is thus part of those structures. However, countries that do not directly produce digital technologies face daunting challenges, unlike analog sovereignty. They cannot have supreme authority over stuff they do not own in a world where geopolitics has become a prime driver. That does not mean they should forget about it. Instead, they should work together to get there sooner rather than later — or never.

Raul

References